Wednesday, 9 May 2012


I’ve reached a state of psychological pluralism and post-structuralist psyche. I recognise the many meta-narratives that define me and I have constructed a post-meta-narrative (PMN) that includes these many meta-narratives. I recognise the fact that one can never be aware of all meta-narratives as they are simply infinite, and any attempt to do so would probably lead to schizophrenia. It’s the flip coin to absurdism. All is absurd because it is equally complex and chaotic. Chaos is synonymous to complexity.

If every paradigm is a local metanarrative, there is no way to achieve a state of that ideal all-encompassing post-metanarrative, but only create a metnaarrative that recognises and integrates a plurality of metanarratives. This post-metanarrative continuously evolves, absorbing and assimilating new meta-narratives as well as refining and evolving existing meta-narratives. I as well recognise that the metanarrative I have constructed for myself is highly personal and subjective and almost impossible to communicate. I also recognise that the very concept of meta-narratives and post-meta-narratives is also based on my own perspective and may not be recognised by other perspectives. But my personal concept of a post-metanarrative leaves room for other people’s narratives, and accepts them as entities in themselves that may or may not be assimilated by my own meta-narrative, nevertheless they are as valid as any of the meta-narratives that I have collected myself.

Still there seems to be an inherent need in me to organise these meta-narratives in a hierarchical structure and group them within a larger ever-growing post-metanarrative. There always needs to be an organising monadic force. Is this because of spiritual/scientific/genetic/linguistic conditioning or is there a natural movement towards a coherent singular post-metanarrative? It is very possible that it is a genetic defense mechanism to ensure there is a consistent understanding of the world. There is also the modernist conditioning which could be argued that it stems from the western Christian-Aristotelian metanarrative. Because of its post-structuralist/post-postmodern nature, the post-metanarrative (or more accurately the post-structuralist metanarrative) is not teleological, and cannot be a totalising, all-encompassing, categorical entity as understood in modernist terms. The PMN does not pose as a teleological entity as the modernist meta-narrative, but recognises the fact that is merely a progression of the meta-narratives that came before it, and that it is a pastiche of these meta-narratives in the postmodern sense.

Meta-narratives clearly have their own evolutionary game, they cooperate and compete to create complex networks and systems of meta-narratives. They can be thought in the flowic categorisation system of body-network-system. Their smallest units, simple narratives, can be likened to Jungian archetypes, archetypal myths and primal memes. As meta-narratives evolve into complex systems, they engulf each other increasing in sophistication. A fully grown meta-narrative is a cultural entity that defines the reality and understanding of millions of people. Examples of meta-narratives include, Christianity, Buddhism, Science, Modernism, Post-modernism, Platonism, Spiritualism, etc. A meta-narrative poses as the one truth, and people following (consciously and subconsciously) these meta-narratives are often unable to recognise the validity of other meta-narratives. But also as meta-narrative sophistication increases so does its integration of other meta-narratives grows, increasing its validity. Christianity assimilated Aristotelian (and others) metanarratives just like modernism assimilated Christian-Aristotelian-Industrial metanarratives, posing as a new all-encompassing narrative. The post-structuralist and post-postmodern metanarrative goes a step further to integrate all possible metanarratives including the seemingly opposite modernist metanarrative. At the same time it refutes any teleology or modernist totalising nature and replaces that with a multiplicity and plurality. Thus the post-structuralist metanarrative becomes a paradoxical all-encompassing totalising MN, by rejecting a teleological state and by accepting all metanarratives, or the possibility of integration of all metanarratives.

Because of its pluralist outlook, the PMN hints at the existence of more than one PMN. Many PMNs can arise starting a new evolutionary play, leading to post-post-metanarratives and so on. There are personal PMNs and there are communal, societal PMNs (eg. The Flow is my personal PMN which borrows from other people’s PMNs and MNs). They are inherently self aware of their intertextuality and composition of many metanarratives, that is their very definition and identity and that is what gives them a status higher than simple multinarratives. They are the evolved metanarratives that recognise personal truth as well as multiple truths. PMN integration leads to the formulation of truth entities. These are post-cultural paradigms that include many PMNs both personal and societal. In fact in a post-cultural state, personal and group truths are one and the same. In the post-cultural word, people converse in PMNs, they are the currency for understanding and constructing truths. This communication can only be achieved by an evolved meta-language whose grammar is able to grasp the complexities of multi-metanarrative intersections and PMN construction and deconstruction.

“narrative lifestyle”
It holds that the idea that science can or should operate according to universal and fixed rules is unrealistic, pernicious and detrimental to science itself.[1]

Replacing grand, universal narratives with small, local narratives
According to the advocates of postmodernism, metanarratives have lost their power to convince – they are, literally, stories that are told in order to legitimise various versions of 'the truth'. With the transition from modern to postmodern, Lyotard proposes that metanarratives should give way to petits récits, or more modest and "localized" narratives.[citation needed] Borrowing from the works of Wittgenstein and his theory of the "models of discourse,"[5] Lyotard constructs his vision of a progressive politics that is grounded in the cohabitation of a whole range of diverse and always locally legitimated language games. Postmodernists attempt to replace metanarratives by focusing on specific local contexts as well as the diversity of human experience. They argue for the existence of a "multiplicity of theoretical standpoints"[6] rather than grand, all-encompassing theories.

Is poststructuralism a metanarrative?
Lyotard's analysis of the postmodern condition has been criticized as being internally inconsistent. For example, thinkers like Alex Callinicos[7] and Jürgen Habermas[8] argue that Lyotard's description of the postmodern world as containing an "incredulity toward metanarratives" could be seen as a metanarrative in itself. According to this view, post-structuralist thinkers like Lyotard criticise universal rules but postulate that postmodernity contains a universal skepticism toward metanarratives; and this 'universal skepticism' is in itself a contemporary metanarrative. Like a post-modern neo-romanticist metanarrative that intends to build up a 'meta' critic, or 'meta' discourse and a 'meta' belief holding up that Western science is just taxonomist, empiricist, utilitarian, assuming a supposed sovereignty around its own reason and pretending to be neutral, rigorous and universal. This is itself an obvious sample of another 'meta' story, self-contradicting the postmodern critique of the metanarrative.[citation needed]

Thus, Lyotard's postmodern incredulity towards metanarratives could be said to be self-refuting. If one is skeptical of universal narratives such as 'truth', 'knowledge', 'right', or 'wrong', then there is no basis for believing the 'truth' that metanarratives are being undermined. In this sense, this paradox of postmodernism is similar to the liar's paradox ("This statement is false.") Perhaps postmodernists, like Lyotard, are not offering us a utopian, teleological metanarrative, but in many respects their arguments are open to metanarrative interpretation. They place much emphasis on the irrational, though in doing so apply the instruments of reason.[original research?][citation needed].
But of course, that is only from a modernist perspective, since such an argument against postmodernism is an attempt towards making a totalizing metanarrative of postmodernism, an attempt to deconstruct postmodernism using totalizing criticisms of a supposed a priori of postmodernism, assuming that postmodernism follows the linear categorical logic of modernism, when postmodernism really uses the categories of logic in a contingent fashion, in an incredulity while taking in account of the multiplicitous nature of language-games and their limitations in ascent to a discovery of a higher truth of paralogy.[original research?]
This means that there are many possible conceptual schemes, or perspectives in which judgment of truth or value can be made. This is often taken to imply that no way of seeing the world can be taken as definitively "true", but does not necessarily entail that all perspectives are equally valid.

Perspectivism rejects objective metaphysics as impossible, and claims that no objective evaluations can transcend cultural formations or subjective designations. This means that there are no objective facts, and that there can be no knowledge of a thing in itself. This separates truth from a particular (or single) vantage point, and means that there are no ethical or epistemological absolutes.[1] This leads to constant reassessment of rules (i.e., those of philosophy, the scientific method, etc.) according to the circumstances of individual perspectives.[2] "Truth" is thus formalized as a whole that is created by integrating different vantage points together.
pluralism, multiplicity

Some chaos magicians like to operate in what is sometimes called a meta-paradigm. This is much akin to syncretism but with the consideration that flexibility of belief is a means of personal power and freedom. A more or less syncretic reality tunneling. Even more removed from this, being a post-meta-paradigmatic view, or an abstention from the notion of any view being absolute, compare Nietzsche's Perspectivism.

mrk: hypersigils are in effect personal meta-narratives, (similar to the multi-narrative concept of that book metaphors we live by? is that where I read that from) the difference being that the hypersigil adds a manifestation dimension to it, so it is not just a mere re-interpretation and clarification of a personal meta-narrative, it is a conscious re-ordering and transformation of the narrative that leads to conscious manifestation of will. It is manifestation of thoughtforms.

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